Nonreductive Physicalism has been suggested as the stance proper from where to study consciousness [1]. Physicalism is the extreme form of materialism that denies the very existence of spiritual entities and processes, and considers matter the single ontological basis of reality, including cognitive and emotional reality.

Any science has to assume the reality of its objective axiomatically. What is the objective, if the science is about consciousness, and what is the reality, if a materialist approach is chosen? The objective is the combination of mind and brain, and the reality is physical. Neither is the objective matter, nor is the reality material. Although the approach is intended to be one of material identism, the objective and its reality depart from matter and materialism. Because, a specific yet unspecified model is inherent in the axiomatically presumed identity, namely the model of an entity that consists of two components that are unmixed and inseparable. Were they assumed to be mixed the objective would reduce itself to brain physiology and epi-phenomenalism. Were they assumed to be separable a non-reductive approach would be impossible. Because, in this case, in order to handle a scientific objective of two different ontological stati, a reduction to the single science known to study such an objective would be necessary, i.e. the science of physics which handles radiation and matter alternatively with the same degree of formalization.

Nonreductive physicalism is the axiomatic assertion that a mindbrain exists, and due to this reality can be studied quantitatively and qualitytively as exact as physics studies matter. Note that exactness does not imply measurement. There may be other forms of exactness that go without measurement, and it may even be the case that they do not exist yet, and still need to be developed in the course of the progress of the science. This does not affect the axiom, and this is exactly the option left open by non-reductionism.

Reductionism is the project of applying laws found in some other science to the science in question. Let us assume that this has been achieved for the science of consciousness, the latter defined as said, i.e. as mindbrainology. Two cases are possible:

1st case: The source science is simple, as opposed to composite. Then the laws of this simple science apply to a 2-fold composite unity, i.e. the target science. This means that, in causal processes, each one of the two components must complement the other. From this follows that both components are necessary for these processes. From which follows that the source science cannot be simple, but must be composite, too, although in an undiscovered way.

2nd case: The source science is composite as well. For its laws to apply to the target science, the structure of the interfaces between the two respective components must be identical. If the source science is physics it follows that that interface is universal and the source of the laws found. As only one source of the laws of Nature is possible, it follows that each science is composite and features the same interface.

The initial quantitative studies of the advocates of nonreductive physicalism [2] merged into philosophical confessions [3,4], without providing outlooks to any new law or algorithm. New either one would have had to be, because otherwise it would have been reductive, not non-reductive. Non-reductive physicalism ended in a profound failure. No effort was made to dismount from the high horse and change to reductionism, i.e. apply known formalisms drawn from a source science.

Let us try to learn something from this story for the Chalmers theory. David Chalmers distinguished between easy and hard problems in the study of consciousness [5]. The easy problems are called easy, because they are considered technical. Soon we should be able to emulate peripheral elements of consciousness, like perception and memory, on an artificial substrate. The hard problem is called hard, because no level of technological achievement could ever lead to experience, or to a 1st person account of the substrate. - At first sight this sounds like Chalmers assumes consciousness to be composite in the sense discussed above. At second glance it is clear, though, that the two components differ in ontological status. The perception part is an accidental to the core part, which is assumed to be a substance. So, what is said is that there is no way to explain a substance from its accidentals. This is a Scholastic stance that is at odds with modern science. To save the idea we need to translate it into a structural paradigm, i.e. aliken both aspects of consciousness as to their ontological states. We do this by considering the border between them their ontological basis. They exist, because they are separated. The border is the objective of consciousnessology. It is real, as need be for any science to be one.

So far, the discussion leads up to two choices: Either we accept reductionism. Then we need to use physics as the source science. Or we decide on non-reductionism. Then the ontological basis of mindbrainology is the interface between mind and brain. It separates that part of the objective that is accessible by quantitative means from that one which is open to empathy only. Here the problem of exactness arises. As there is no mother-science to retreat to, we need to build our own formal, possibly algorithmic framework from scratch. That this is possible is implied in our set of axioms. The first one of these says that our objective does exist. The second one says that it is a structure (namely the border between hard and easy phenomena). From it the third axiom is drawn, namely that the objective, being a structure, can be subjected to objective, or exact, methods equivalent to those applied in physics. This latter, deduced axiom is called the one of physicalism, in a narrower sense of the term.

The reason why the project of non-reductive physicalism failed as mentioned is that it was not performed. The advocates of the idea meant to do it, but clung to substantialism, instead. The very idea of the interface seems to be a hard problem in itself. For hermeneutic reasons, i.e. to familiarize ourselves with it, let us venture the most audacious hypothesis possible, i.e. that the ontological basis of the objective of any science is an interface. It separates that part of the objective that is accessible by quantitative methods from that one which is open to empathy only. Let us test this hypothesis by probing physics.

All of physics is accessible by mathematics, and there is no part in physics that cannot be described mathematically. On the other hand, mathematics is larger than physics by parts that are pure, unstained by applications. As experience has taught, these parts are predictive of a physics yet unknown. There is a physics that is enlightened by mathematics, and there is another physics that rides in the dark. There are functions that are accompanied by experience (sensu Chalmers), and there are others that ride in the dark. [6]. And so for all of science and the humanities. There is a cut through the phenomenological and epistemological world without which the world would not exist. This cut is the ontological basis of the world, the reason why and what for it is there in the first place.

Physicalism means to ground a knowledge system on that wing of the bi-plane named world that flies by known tools, e.g. mathematics. There to seek for the other wing creates an unsolvable, hard problem. On the other hand, to focus on the wing proper leaves one hovering in mid air without fuselage and engine, i.e. without objective methods. So, physicalism is wrong. Materialism, of which physcalism is part, in a wider or more general sense, may nevertheless even be true, though, because nobody knows what nature that cut is of. Dualism is false, because it assumes unmixed separability, and idealism is false, because it focusses on that wing hovering lonely. The only ism coined and applicable is structuralism. So, let's take that on and study structures, as Chalmers wisely suggests [7]. The problem of consciousness we'll solve in passing as soon as we achieved mastership over structures, i.e. will be able to reproduce the ontogenetic cut at our discretion.

Philosophy starts from being perplexed by Nature and goes on to explain her. The epistemic direction is one way from the unmanageable towards culture. Structurology is one way, too, but into the opposite direction. We explain the world to the transcendental. The philosopher is like (Goethe’s) Doctor Faustus who, powered by insights into Nature, creates an artificial man in vitro and breaks new ground from the sea. The structurologist is like Mephisto, who, knowing in and out the mess the Lord has left behind, reports to Him about it. The philosopher's job is revelation, the structurologist's job is betrayal. If, according to our hypothesis, there is only one cut through the world, all findings are final. The first candidate for a theory of the cut is the theory of fractals. Is the cut a Julia set? How would this fit to consciousness?

A progressing Julia set creates two borders, a sheer and a messy one. While there is darkness beyond the hard border, the messiness beyond the soft border evolves into sequences of change. Stages can be discerned within these sequences, and the maximum number of stages is seven. At stage seven, or earlier, the sequence gives re-birth to the original Julia set. This reminds of consciousness being relentlessly dynamic, with the source of these dynamics being twofold. First, cognition can procede as a stimulus-reaction-stimulus-chain. Please, permit me to call this mode of cognition "symmetrical." Second, cognition can quote phenomena that are unrelated between themselves, and are only combined by the author of thought. May I please call this function "quotational thought." It reminds of the dark or empty area produced by the Julia set.

Experience, the stuff Chalmers finds so hard to explain, is perception. If cognition is in the symmetrical mode, quotational thought watches what happens, and vice versa. This monitoring is experience. If there is no experience - "dark riding" - then neither one of these modes are active.

In physics, the dark side is radiation, and the messy side is matter. The Julia set cutting in between is a field. Or is it a string? Please ask a physicist. In any case it is something that cuts the void in two, creating structure.